请选择 进入手机版 | 继续访问电脑版

阜南政务论坛 阜南网络问政

 找回密码
 获得账号
搜索
热搜: 活动 交友 discuz
12
返回列表 发新帖
楼主: 日月星

[经验] 安徽省电子政务建设的实践与思考

  [复制链接]

0

主题

0

好友

290

积分

禁止发言

积分
290
帖子
63
发表于 2015-6-22 00:38:36 |显示全部楼层
提示: 作者被禁止或删除 内容自动屏蔽
回复

使用道具 评分 举报

0

主题

0

好友

290

积分

禁止发言

积分
290
帖子
63
发表于 2015-6-22 01:34:56 |显示全部楼层
提示: 作者被禁止或删除 内容自动屏蔽
回复

使用道具 评分 举报

0

主题

0

好友

84

积分

注册会员

Rank: 2

积分
84
帖子
8
发表于 2015-7-18 13:56:55 |显示全部楼层
★请联系θθ[860029698] 2015年全国注册二级建造师答.案,执业**资格\初级护师资格\中级主管护师\执业医师资格\执业药师资格\监理工程师考试\二级建造师考试\造价工程师考试\一级建造师考试\安全工程师考试\中级会计师考试\中级经济师考试。
教学方式选进,支持考一科付一科。通过率有点高。【选择必过,一生无忧】
北京市 京 北京
天津市 津 天津
河北省 冀 石家庄市
山西省 晋 太原市
内蒙古自治区 内蒙古 呼和浩特市
辽宁省 辽 沈阳市
吉林省 吉 长春市
黑龙江省 黑 哈尔滨市
上海市 沪/申 上海
江苏省 苏 南京市
浙江省 浙 杭州市
安徽省 皖 合肥市
福建省 闽 福州市
江西省 赣 南昌市
山东省 鲁 济南市
河南省 豫 郑州市
湖北省 鄂 武汉市
湖南省 湘 长沙市
广东省 粤 广州市
广西壮族自治区 桂 南宁市
海南省 琼 海口市
重庆市 渝 重庆
四川省 川/蜀 成都市
贵州省 黔/贵 贵阳市
云南省 云/滇 昆明市
陕西省 陕/秦 西安市
甘肃省 甘/陇 兰州市
回复

使用道具 评分 举报

0

主题

0

好友

50

积分

注册会员

Rank: 2

积分
50
帖子
7
发表于 2015-10-18 22:16:28 |显示全部楼层
知名申博娱乐申博官网网上娱乐真人棋牌、电子、体育竞彩游戏平台打开加盟代理之门诚邀您的到来!官方网站以最信誉,公平、全天24小时专业为您和您的客户服务。赶快来了解详细流程吧,有24小时客服咨询了解相关事宜!官网:sunbetshenbo.net
回复

使用道具 评分 举报

0

主题

0

好友

172

积分

注册会员

Rank: 2

积分
172
帖子
26
发表于 2015-11-24 15:52:04 |显示全部楼层
有买有送了,男人的福利,征服女人的利器,包你满意,微信:hh38883 等你哦!!

回复

使用道具 评分 举报

0

主题

0

好友

66

积分

注册会员

Rank: 2

积分
66
帖子
5
发表于 2015-12-25 10:26:55 |显示全部楼层
Contents
Preface page xi
1 Introduction 1
Empirical psychology and philosophical analysis 2
Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind 3
A brief guide to the rest of this book 6
2 Minds, bodies and people 8
Cartesian dualism 9
The conceivability argument 11
The divisibility argument 13
Non-Cartesian dualism 15
Are persons simple substances? 18
Conceptual objections to dualistic interaction 21
Empirical objections to dualistic interaction 24
The causal closure argument 26
Objections to the causal closure argument 29
Other arguments for and against physicalism 32
Conclusions 36
3 Mental states 39
Propositional attitude states 40
Behaviourism and its problems 41
Functionalism 44
Functionalism and psychophysical identity theories 48
The problem of consciousness 51
Qualia and the inverted spectrum argument 53
Some possible responses to the inverted spectrum argument 55
The absent qualia argument and two notions of consciousness 59
Eliminative materialism and ‘folk psychology’ 61
Some responses to eliminative materialism 64
Conclusions 66
vii
viii Contents
4 Mental content 69
Propositions 70
The causal relevance of content 74
The individuation of content 79
Externalism in the philosophy of mind 82
Broad versus narrow content 84
Content, representation and causality 89
Misrepresentation and normality 92
The teleological approach to representation 95
Objections to a teleological account of mental content 99
Conclusions 100
5 Sensation and appearance 102
Appearance and reality 103
Sense-datum theories and the argument from 【请不要乱说话,词语被禁止】 107
Other arguments for sense-data 110
Objections to sense-datum theories 112
The adverbial theory of sensation 114
The adverbial theory and sense-data 116
Primary and secondary qualities 119
Sense-datum theories and the primary/secondary distinction 121
An adverbial version of the primary/secondary distinction 125
Do colour-properties really exist? 126
Conclusions 128
6 Perception 130
Perceptual experience and perceptual content 131
Perceptual content, appearance and qualia 135
Perception and causation 137
Objections to causal theories of perception 143
The disjunctive theory of perception 145
The computational and ecological approaches to perception 149
Consciousness, experience and ‘blindsight’ 155
Conclusions 158
7 Thought and language 160
Modes of mental representation 162
The ‘language of thought’ hypothesis 164
Analogue versus digital representation 167
Imagination and mental imagery 169
Thought and communication 175
Do animals think? 178
Natural language and conceptual schemes 183
Contents ix
Knowledge of language: innate or acquired? 188
Conclusions 191
8 Human rationality and artificial intelligence 193
Rationality and reasoning 194
The Wason selection task 196
The base rate fallacy 200
Mental logic versus mental models 203
Two kinds of rationality 208
Artificial intelligence and the Turing test 209
Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ thought-experiment 214
The Frame Problem 218
Connectionism and the mind 221
Conclusions 227
9 Action, intention and will 230
Agents, actions and events 231
Intentionality 235
The individuation of actions 240
Intentionality again 243
Trying and willing 246
Volitionism versus its rivals 250
Freedom of the will 252
Motives, reasons and causes 257
Conclusions 262
10 Personal identity and self-knowledge 264
The first person 266
Persons and criteria of identity 270
Personal memory 277
Memory and causation 282
Animalism 283
Knowing one’s own mind 288
Moore’s paradox and the nature of conscious belief 291
Externalism and self-knowledge 293
Self-deception 296
Conclusions 297
Bibliography 298
Index 313

Preface
At a time when many introductory books on the philosophy
of mind are available, it would be fair to ask me why I have
written another one. I have at least two answers to this question.
One is that some of the more recent introductions to
this subject have been rather narrow in their focus, tending
to concentrate upon the many different ‘isms’ that have
emerged of late – reductionism, functionalism, eliminativism,
instrumentalism, non-reductive physicalism and so
forth, all of them divisible into further sub-varieties. Another
is that I am disturbed by the growing tendency to present
the subject in a quasi-scientific way, as though the only
proper role for philosophers of mind is to act as junior partners
within the wider community of ‘cognitive scientists’. It
may be true that philosophers of an earlier generation were
unduly dismissive – and, indeed, ignorant – of empirical psychology
and neuroscience, but now there is a danger that the
pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction.
Perhaps it will be thought that my two answers are in conflict
with one another, inasmuch as the current obsession
with the different ‘isms’ does at least appear to indicate an
interest in the metaphysics of mind, a distinctly philosophical
enterprise. But there is no real conflict here, because much
of the so-called ‘metaphysics’ in contemporary philosophy of
mind is really rather lightweight, often having only a tenuous
relation to serious foundational work in ontology. In fact,
most of the current ‘isms’ in the philosophy of mind are generated
by the need felt by their advocates to propound and
justify a broadly physicalist account of the mind and its capaxi
xii Preface
cities, on the questionable assumption that this alone can
render talk about the mind scientifically respectable. Many
of the esoteric disputes between philosophers united by this
common assumption have arisen simply because it is very
unclear just what ‘physicalism’ in the philosophy of mind
really entails. In the chapters that follow, I shall try not to
let that relatively sterile issue dominate and distort our philosophical
inquiries.
This book is aimed primarily at readers who have already
benefited from a basic grounding in philosophical argument
and analysis and are beginning to concentrate in more detail
upon specific areas of philosophy, in this case the philosophy
of mind. The coverage of the subject is broad but at the same
time, I hope, sharply focused and systematic. A start is made
with a look at some fundamental metaphysical problems of
mind and body, with arguments for and against dualism providing
the focus of attention. Then some general theories of
the nature of mental states are explained and criticised, the
emphasis here being upon the strengths and weaknesses of
functionalist approaches. Next we turn to problems concerning
the ‘content’ of intentional states of mind, such as
the question of whether content can be assigned to mental
states independently of the wider physical environments of
the subjects whose states they are. In the remaining chapters
of the book, attention is focused successively upon more specific
aspects of mind and personality: sensation, perception,
thought and language, reasoning and intelligence, action and
intention, and finally personal identity and self-knowledge.
The order in which these topics are covered has been deliberately
chosen so as to enable the reader to build upon the
understanding gained from earlier chapters in getting to
grips with the topics of later chapters. Rather than include
separate guides to further reading for the topics covered by
the book, I have avoided unnecessary duplication by constructing
the notes for each chapter in such a way that they
serve this purpose as well as providing references.
The book is not partisan, in the sense of espousing an
exclusive approach to questions about the mind in general –
Preface xiii
such as any particular form of physicalism or dualism – but
at the same time it does not remain blandly neutral on more
specific issues. Developments in empirical psychology are
taken into account, but are not allowed to overshadow genuinely
philosophical problems. Indeed, my approach is a problem-
oriented one, raising questions and possible answers,
rather than aiming to be purely instructive. I have

tc慧先





联系QQ:526781618

淘宝旺旺:跟朝流走

有需要的欢迎联系!专业代购电子书



ebook 英文电子书代购
回复

使用道具 评分 举报

0

主题

0

好友

132

积分

注册会员

Rank: 2

积分
132
帖子
30
发表于 2016-5-6 07:21:49 |显示全部楼层
★★出售金融理财币资金盘互助盘网站QQ858882234 类似百川理财积分摩根币mmm金融互助盘开发订做定做建站维护等一切网站业务qq858882234
回复

使用道具 评分 举报

0

主题

0

好友

140

积分

注册会员

Rank: 2

积分
140
帖子
25
发表于 2016-5-16 03:26:23 |显示全部楼层
男人的福音,女人的最爱! 猛男最需要的东西!!价值你懂的,详情加QQ:3213228879  
w银川
回复

使用道具 评分 举报

0

主题

0

好友

81

积分

注册会员

Rank: 2

积分
81
帖子
12
发表于 2016-5-20 01:46:01 |显示全部楼层
楼主说得对,顶!d=====( ̄▽ ̄*)b file:///C:/Users/120/AppData/Local/Temp/SGPicFaceTpBq/4968/10087CD1.gif
回复

使用道具 评分 举报

0

主题

0

好友

140

积分

注册会员

Rank: 2

积分
140
帖子
27
发表于 2016-5-20 02:55:23 |显示全部楼层
男人的福音,女人的最爱! 猛男最需要的东西!!价值你懂的,详情加QQ:3/2/1/3/2/2/8/8/7/9  
a滨州
回复

使用道具 评分 举报

您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 获得账号

手机版|Archiver|阜南政务论坛 ( 皖ICP备08006544号-1 )

GMT+8, 2017-9-22 05:26 , Processed in 0.191463 second(s), 18 queries .

Powered by Discuz! X2.5

© 2001-2012 Comsenz Inc.

回顶部